Grupo Aeroméxico:
Nueva Visión Mar/May 2026

Aeroméxico used the process to renew the fleet. It disposed of its ERJ-145/E-170 regional aircraft and some 20 737-700/800s while taking delivery of new 737MAX-8/9s. The airline, helped by renegotiated labour contracts, cut nearly 20% of its pre-pandemic non-fuel unit costs (CASK), removing $450m annual spend; halve the cost differential between it and competitor ULCCs Volaris and Viva Aerobus, while achieving double their unit revenues at 9.1¢/RASK; and by 2024 attain highly competitive stage length-adjusted ex-fuel unit cost of 5.6¢/ASK compared (according to its calculations) with 8.4¢/ASK for its North American, and 8.1¢ for its European. competitors.

But the market it re-emerged into had changed.

Mexican Aviation

The Mexican market experienced strong growth through the 2010s driven by the expansion of low cost carriers and boosted by the signing of an open skies agreement with the US in 2013. Domestic passenger numbers increased by an average annual rate of 9.1% over the decade to 2019 ending the decade accounting for half of the Mexican air market. Over the same period international passengers grew by a more modest 7.9% pa, but international passengers carried on Mexican airlines increased by an annual 11.5%.

Traffic is heavily concentrated in a few key hubs. Just four airports (Mexico City International, Cancún, Guadalajara, and Monterrey) handle over 57% of all passenger traffic. Furthermore, Cancún, Mexico City, and Los Cabos account for nearly 70% of all international traffic, highlighting the market’s strong dependence on tourism and leisure. It is also dependent on the transborder routes with the USA: around 63% of international passengers to Mexico originate in the United States — and five metropolitan areas (Los Angeles, Dallas, Houston, Chicago and Miami) generate more than half the inbound traffic. The US carriers dominate the transborder routes, but two thirds of their capacity is flown to Mexican beach destinations (for Delta, Aeroméxico’s JV partner, that ratio is 73%). Flights from Mexico to the US meanwhile tend to be VFR, south to north leisure, and corporate.

The domestic market recovered strongly after the pandemic and passenger numbers surpassed the 2019 peak in 2022. The international market (particulary for Mexican flagged airlines) was held back by a regulatory hiccup: the FAA downgraded Mexico’s aviation industry to Category 2 in August 2021 after an assessment identified several areas of noncompliance with the minimum international safety standards. As a result Mexican scheduled carriers were not allowed to increase services to the US until Category 1 status was restored in September 2023.

In 2019 the domestic market had been shared equally by four airlines (see charts): full service network carrier Aeroméxico, hybrid player Interjet and ULCCs Volaris and Viva. Interjet succumbed to the COVID-19 virus and stopped flying in late 2020. (It was finally liquidated in 2023). By 2025 the domestic market was some 20% larger than its prepandemic peak; Aeroméxico had maintained its 25% market share; but the ULCCs emerged with three-quarters of the market.

Not that Aeroméxico did not benefit strongly: Interjet in 2019 had had 25% of the slots at Aeroméxico’s main hub in Mexico City’s Benito Juárez International Airport (AICM) against Aeroméxico’s then 52% (now 56%). Interjet’s demise left Aeroméxico firmly in charge at the capital’s congested airport.

There is a significant level of competition as the chart shows. The three carriers overlap on 32% of domestic capacity. Volaris and Viva directly compete on a further 45%. Aeromexico has the smallest proportion of domestic capacity without direct competition at 2%; Viva 7%; and Volaris 9%.

And then in December 2025, Volaris and Viva announced plans for a “merger of equals” integrating the two brands under a single holding company “Grupo Más Vuelos”.

Infrastructure Constraints and Regulatory Retaliation

Mexico City is one the world’s largest cities with a population in the greater metropolitan area of 25m. And yet until recently it had one major airport with only two runways. AICM (which, bizarrely, is operated by the Mexican Navy) at the peak in 2019 handled 50m terminal passengers. Expansion options are very limited: it is surrounded by heavily populated city neighbourhoods; the runways are only 300 metres apart making simultaneous independent operations impossible. In 2014 the Mexican authorities declared Mexico City’s airspace was saturated and limited operations to 61 movements an hour.

The Government at the time announced plans for a new $13bn six-runway airport to be built (with an initial capacity of 68mppa) on the dry bed of Lake Tococo — claimed as Mexico’s largest infrastructure project in a century — aiming it to replace AICM in 2023. Construction started in 2015 but was abandoned in 2018 after a referendum. In its place it was decided to upgrade an existing Air Force base for civilian use. Construction started on the Felipe Ángeles International Airport (AIFA), located 40km north of Mexico City, in 2019 and it opened in 2022 (and is run by the Defence Ministry).

The authorities tried to encourage airlines to move to the new airport using carrots and sticks. In 2023 a decree was published forcing all-cargo flights to move operations from AICM to AIFA. It relaxed the strict rules requiring domestic passengers to arrive at the airport three hours before their flight. It offered reduced airport charges, said to be 50% below those at AICM. And then, at short notice, it slashed the maximum number of permitted hourly movements at AICM from 61 to 52, and then to 43, enforcing a 30% reduction in capacity and confiscation of slots.

Anger at these moves blew up into a fight in 2025. The US Government accused Mexico of violating the open skies agreement (the Trump administration’s Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy naturally blaming Joe Biden for complicity) insisting that the changes were “actively and significantly impairing US carriers’ fair and equal opportunity to compete”. It responded by prohibiting “combination” flights (passenger flights carrying belly-hold cargo) between the USA and Felipe Ángeles, requiring Mexican carriers to obtain prior DOT approval for flights and file flight schedules in advance with the department; and it proposed revoking the antitrust immunity for the joint venture between Delta and Aeroméxico.

The US and Mexico reached a preliminary agreement in May 2026 to de-escalate the tension. Mexican authorities have committed to adopt an airport capacity declaration process based on international standards and ensuring “fair and transparent” access to slots at AICM for US carriers (without specifying a timeline for the restoration of confiscated slots). They have also allowed a modest increase in hourly aircraft movements at AICM to 46 per hour, contingent on infrastructure upgrades.

Meanwhil, the mandated dismantling of the Delta/Aeroméxico joint venture received a reprieve. The Court of Appeals in November 2025 temporarily blocked the DOT’s directive to unwind the JV by the beginning of 2026, and in April agreed to “expedite” the carriers’ appeal against the decision, with Delta and Aeroméxico arguing that the DOT’s order is “arbitrary and capricious many times over”.

The end of the JV would have been a severe blow. It’s been in operation for the past ten years, and allowed the two carriers to coordinate scheduling and prices on a “metal neutral” basis on what, for Aeroméxico, is the most profitable part of its network.

Strong results and an IPO

During the recovery from the pendemic Aeromexico concentrated on its status as the only full service domestic carrier in the domestic market, and targeted profitability. After traffic recovered in 2022 to approach the company’s prepandemic peak (of 21.8m passengers in 2018) the airline has taken a muted approach to capacity growth. Taking a leaf out of partner Delta’s strategy, it has concentrated on segmenting the cabin to upsell premium products while having a basic economy fare to compete head on with the ULCCs. In 2024 it carried over 25m passengers, 23% higher than in 2018, but generated revenues of over $5.6bn, nearly 60% higher. The cost restructuring it had been through allowed it to generate an EBITDAR margin of 31% — a tad below that achieved by domestic competitor Volaris of 36%, but twice the level of that achieved by the top three US legacy carriers. Operating margins, which during the 2010s had come in at 5% at best, surged to 19%. The company also managed to achieve the accolade of Cirium’s most punctual global airline award with a 90% T+15 on-time performance (repeated for an unprecedented second time in 2025).

In November 2025, the group returned to the stockmarkets through a dual-market IPO on the BMV and NYSE valuing it at $2.8bn. It raised a modest $275m in the process and a concurrent private placement ($178m in new equity and the remainder in secondary sales by the backers of the bankruptcy restructuring). As a result Apollo’s stake fell to 19.1% from 22.4%, but leaving it the largest shareholder just ahead of Delta with 18.7%.

The results for 2025 showed a slight dip from the record performance in 2024. Passenger numbers declined by 3% influenced by cross-border disruptions probably relating to the aftermath of the inauguration of the new administration in Washington. Revenues fell by 5% and net income slid by 43% to $352m. But the group still achieved an EBITDAR margin of 31.2% and operating margins of 17.3%. It ended the year with net cash of $1bn (and total liquidity of $1.2bn), an acceptable gearing ratio of net debt to EBITDA of 1.7x, but still had a net equity deficit of nearly $600m.

The first quarter of 2026 in contrast showed a strong performance. Capacity fell marginally by 1.2%, but passenger unit revenues grew by nearly 15% compared with the prior year period and total revenue grew by 13% year on year to $1.34bn. The company notes that premium ticket sales account for 42% of passenger revenues. The group posted an operating income of $142m representing a comfortable 11% margin.